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1. 1550-1650: a fault-line in Western legal history
Between the mid-sixteenth century and the mid-seventeenth century, a fun-
damental change took place in Western legal history. When one looks at “main-
stream legal methods”, the intellectual environment of practicing lawyers in the
1650swas clearly different from that of their predecessors one century earlier. In
the present contribution in honour of Mario Ascheri, I would like to offer a few
elements – no more – which may begin to explain why one may recognize a
fault-line in legal reasoning from the mid-sixteenth century onwards. My thesis
is that this was a general development in European civil law history at the time,
which can be traced – perhaps for each territorywith a slightly different chronol-
ogy, or sometimes with a varying intensity – in most jurisdictions where the ius
commune tradition had gained a foothold. For the purpose of a brief argument,
only a few collections of consilia and Decisiones from the (Southern)
Netherlands will here be mentioned. Focusing on legal practice offers the main
advantage that one deals primarily with the prevailing (or “mainstream”) legal
trends and currents. At the same time, it gives the opportunity to present amore
personal homage to Mario Ascheri, from whose work, for many decades, I have
been able to benefit in our common area of interest for the life of the early-mod-
ern courts.Moreover, addressing the issue of changing patterns of reasoning and
argumentation in the courts’ practice is a challenging and controversial area of
legal-historical research where the history of the law “in books” and the history
of the law “in action” meet, or, in more general terms, where the interface
between legal scholarship and legal practice can be assessed.
The structural shift in legal thinking1 referred to is that of the “Italian legal
methods” (mos italicus) as the prevailing mould of legal argumentation being
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1 For a general but more elaborate argument of the developments briefly sketched in this paragraph,
and a littlemore on the respective features ofmos italicus andusus modernus, Imay refer tomy text-
book: Introduction historique au droit. France - Allemagne - Angleterre, Paris 2010, pp. 192-201.
replaced by the usus modernus. The mos italicus is a fairly conventional legal-
historiographical category, and its characteristics are not too controversial. It is
widely accepted that both in legal teaching and in legal practice, themos italicus
had amajor impact during the last centuries of theMiddle Ages and throughout
the sixteenth century. As a historiographical category, usus modernus is far less
a consensual reference. The phrase usus modernus is often specifically associat-
ed with the scholarly civil law approach which had become wide-spread in the
Holy Roman Empire from the (late) seventeenth-century onwards. However, by
the time S. Stryk wrote his eponymous work, the legal methods he was refining
had been developing for more than a century, according to a pattern which can
be identified in most Western European territories. What may be referred to as
the new prevailing “early-modern legal methods” (as perhaps a less loaded term
than usus modernus) differed from the earlier prevailingmethods in at least two
ways. In the first place, because it followed a pattern of reasoning much more
based on a systematization ratione materiae of legal topics than before (which
entailed that an issuewas categorizedwithin a certain area of the law,which then
determined which rules of substantive law were more or less exclusively appli-
cable). In the second place, because it merged, in its systematic approach and
discussion of legal topics, ius commune (and especially its Roman law compo-
nent) and the iura propria of a particular jurisdiction (thus creating a fragmen-
tation of ius commune scholarship, for the blend of Roman law and ius propri-
um would inevitably differ from one jurisdiction to another).
2. European usus modernus: scholarship and legal practice
The gradual progress of the usus modernus features, still relatively modest
during the second half of the sixteenth century, but then gaining momentum
during the first half of the seventeenth century, can be trailed through various
means. One indicator of the change is the development of a more systematic
legal literature (no longer strictly bound by the ordo legalis of the Digest or
Justinian’s Code, but more influenced by, for example, the system of the
Institutes) or the increasing number of legal monographs dealing with amore or
less specific area or topic of the law2. Concomitantly, legal reasoning, also among
legal practitioners, tended to follow the changing pattern of argumentation and
to rely more and more on the new legal literature.
Those are features and general developments which can be traced in many
European jurisdictions. A good example which illustrates the emergence of both
innovative characteristics of the usus modernus is the appearance of the format
of early-modernmonographs offering a survey of the lawof a particular legal sys-
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2 The demise ofmos italicus literature even in early seventeenth-century Italy and the development
of new types of legal literature appear clearly through a recent bibliography of seventeenth-century
Italian legal imprints: D.J. Osler, Jurisprudence of the Baroque. A Census of Seventeenth Century
Italian Legal Imprints, 3 vols., Frankfurt amMain 2009, see my review in «Tijdschrift voor rechts-
geschiedenis» (hereafter «TRG»), 80 (2012), pp. 229-237.
tem following the so-called “Institutional system”3. Even in international law, R.
Zouche considered dealing with the subject-matter following the main arrange-
ment of the Roman Institutes4. In the Northern Netherlands, in particular the
influential province of Holland, Hugo Grotius’s Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche
rechts-geleerdheid («Introduction to Holland jurisprudence», ed. pr. 1631, but
written during the author’s captivity in 1619-1621), can also be seen as a brief
overview of the laws in Holland presented in a Roman law mould, and it was a
decisive step towards the formation of Roman-Dutch law. Roman law itself was,
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, increasingly discussed along
the lines of the Institutes: whereas theDigest and the Code had been the primary
sources of the commentaries in theMiddle Ages, following the ordo legum or, in
some cases, the ordo rubricarum, works such as Arnold Vinnius’s commentary
on the Institutes (ed. pr. 1642) became the paradigmatic general overviews, all
over Europe, of civil law.
Teaching, also, was affected by the new paradigms. When the Louvain law
professor Pierre Goudelin (Gudelinus, 1550-1619), who had been teaching the
Digest and the Code during the last decades of the sixteenth century, started giv-
ing lectures «ad ius novissimum»5, he gave in 1599 a programmatic speech in his
university explaining his new approach.His purpose was to include theNovellae
in his teaching, since those sources (previously mainly discussed through the
Authenticum and the authenticae incorporated in the medieval versions of
Justinian’s Code) had been somewhat neglected in the medieval and sixteenth-
century curricula. In his oratio, Goudelin referred to the spectacular develop-
ments of cartography in his days6 which had been able to give a full survey of the
whole world in one synoptic overview (a reference, no doubt, toMercator’s “pro-
jection”). Similarly, Goudelin wanted to provide a general overview of the (civil)
law7. The summa divisio he followed was comparatively recent as a teaching
device: the distinction between private law and public law.However, within each
of those two areas, he then applied the arrangement of the Institutes – indeed,
129
Early-Modern consilia and decisiones in the Low Countries
3 P.G. Stein, The Fate of the Institutional System, in P.G. Stein, The Character and Influence of the
Roman Civil Law. Historical Essays, London-Ronceverte 1988, pp. 73-82; for a full treatment and
survey, see K. Luig, Institutionenlehrbücher des nationalen Rechts im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, in
«Ius commune», 3 (1970), pp. 64-97; K. Luig,The Institutes of National Law in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries, in «Juridical Review», 17 (1972), pp. 193-226.
4 A.Wijffels,Early-modern scholarship on international law, inResearch Handbook on the Theory
and History of International Law, edited by A. Orakhelashvili, Cheltenham and Northhampton,
MA, 2011, pp. 23-60.
5 The editio princeps dates back to 1620. I have used the Antwerp 1644 edition. Among the later edi-
tions, there are two surprisingly late Italian imprints, one at Lucca in 1780 and the other at Florence
in 1839.
6 Some of the most illustrious contemporary cartographers, G. Kremer (Mercator, 1512-1594) and A.
Ortels (Ortelius, 1527-1598), were Belgians who had strong links with the printing business in
Antwerp, situated (as was also Louvain) in the duchy of Brabant.
7 Petrus Gudelinus, Commentariorum de iure novissimo libri sex, Optima methodo, accurate ac
erudite conscripti, additis harum vicinarumque regionum Moribus, Opus ut diu avideque expeti-
tum, ita Scholis Foroque utilissimum, Antverpiae, ex officina typ. Hieronymi Verdussi, 1644,Oratio
Praefationis (ultima charta).
towards the end of his introductory oratio, he professes to attempt a presenta-
tion which would come close to the «Institutionum Iuris novissimi, si non per-
fecta forma, saltem quaedam effigies»8. Hence, Book I of the Ius novissimum
dealswith the lawof persons; Book IIwith the lawonproperty («de eo iure, quod
in rebus habetur»); Book III with obligations and actions; Book IV with proce-
dure. The subject-matter of Book V is public law, and that of Book VI “sacred
law” («De iure sacro»). Within books V and VI, the subdivision is again (follow-
ing in each case a specific hierarchy) based on the sequence of persons, proper-
ty (and rights), actions – the “Institutional system” serving here as a device for
arranging systematically the legal areas outside private law. Moreover, not only
does Goudelin adopt a distinctive arrangement governed by the private-public
law division and the systematizing categories of the Institutes, he also includes
as much as possible for each subject-matter he deals with references to contem-
porary “Belgian law”, i.e. rules of iura propria from the Belgian provinces, and
from surrounding territories. Thus, students at Louvain who would attend
Goudelin’s new lectures, or read his text-book, would have, in a scholarly work
which primarily purported to discuss the Novellae, a systematic overview by
subject-matter of both Roman law and some Belgian law – precisely the two dis-
tinctive characteristics I have attributed above to the new early-modern legal
methods, in this case a Belgian variation on the (early) usus modernus.
3. Belgian usus modernus: early-modern consilia and Decisiones
Legal practice, too, was eventually influenced by a shift towards the early-
modern paradigm. A first indication, although far from conclusive, may consist
in the general arrangement (if any) of collections of consultations (consilia) or
reports on judgments (decisiones). The picture for Belgian collections is not very
different from that in other countries9. Some collections of both consilia and
decisiones, even during the eighteenth century, followed implicitly or explicitly a
chronological order, reflecting the career of their author10. In some cases, a col-
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8 Ibidem.At the beginning of his oratio, Goudelin explains that his first idea had been to revert to the
teaching of the Institutes, but in a more elaborate way.
9 One should still rely on the chapterNiederlande by U.Wagner in H. Coing,Handbuch der Quellen
und Literatur der neueren europäischen Rechtsgeschichte, Bd. II, Neuere Zeit (1500-1800), Das
Zeitalter des gemeinen Rechts, vol. 2,Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung, München 1976, pp. 1399-
1430; see also Ph. Godding, L’origine et l’autorité des recueils de jurisprudence dans les Pays-Bas
Méridionaux (XIIIe - XVIIIe siècles), in Rapports belges au VIIIe Congrès international de droit
comparé, Pescara, 29 août - 5 septembre 1970, Bruxelles 1970, pp. 1-37; A. Wijffels, Legal Records
and Reports in the Great Council of Malines (15th to 18th Centuries), in Judicial Records, Law
Reports, and the Growth of Case Law, edited by J.H. Baker, Berlin 1989, pp. 181-206.
10 For example: Nicolaus Everardus’s consilia (early sixteenth century, ed. pr. 1554) are not dated,
but it has been argued that their sequence in the printed version is chronological; N. du Fief’s early
seventeenth-century notes on decided cases (mainly by the Great Council and by the Privy Council),
not published (but incorporated in the printed reports published under the name of P.C.M. de Saint-
Vaast in 1717 and later) reflect the progress of his career as a councilor at those two councils; J.A. de
Coloma’s reports (printed in 1781) also follow a chronological order. This was the usual way for law
reports, cf. Wijffels, Legal Records and Reports, loc. cit., for reports of the Great Council’s decisions.
lection was (re-)arranged by key-word in alphabetical order11. In other cases, the
author, compiler or publisher attempted to present the material in some logical
order. That was particularly important for the more extensive collections, con-
tained in several volumes, where the system of indices by subject-matter (often
compiled for each volume of the collection) was still somewhat cumbersome.
Two examples from the first half of the seventeenth century (when, as stated
above, subject-related works became an established feature of early-modern
legal literature) may illustrate the hybrid approach employed for consilia and
decisiones. The first example is that of the vast collection of consilia by Jean
Wamèse (Wamesius, 1524-1590). His consultations were published after his
death in two series. First, two volumes of consilia on canon law related issues
(«de iure pontificio») published during the first quarter of the seventeenth cen-
tury12. Here, the arrangement could easily benefit from the already more
advanced systematizationwhich had been reached in theLiber Extra, so that the
conventional ordo titulorum of the compilations of decretals (which followed
itself a rough systematization in five parts by broad subject-matter) could serve
for classifying the “ecclesiastical” consultations. Wamèse’s production of “secu-
lar” consultations (consilia «ad jus, forumque civile pertinent[ia]») had been
even more prolific, providing material for five in-folio volumes13. Here, the first
volume or centuria is said to have been «ordine iudiciario digesta». The
sequence of those first hundred consilia complies with that advertisement on the
title-page: the arrangement of the consultations’ headings starts with consilia on
the courts’ organisation, jurisdiction and powers, and continues with prelimi-
nary procedural issues, followed almost step by step by the various stages of pro-
ceedings, from the initial summons right until, at the end (consultation 100 of
the first centuria) the enforcement of the judgement. For the centuriae II to IV,
each covering a separate volume, the arrangement is supposed to be «ordine tit-
ulorumPandectarumet Codicis digesta». As the combination ofDigest andCode
indicates, this means that a sequence which follows with a degree of flexibility
the order of rubrics in the two main Roman law compilations has been applied.
In the fifth volume, the title-page gives away that to some extent, somewhat dif-
ferent criteria have also prevailed: the fifth centuria is announced on the title-
page as having been «ordine titulorum Pandectarum et Codicis digesta, conti-
nensmaterias Feudales, Donationum,Dotium,Matrimoniales», which indicates
a certain focus around family property issues, although antenuptial contracts
and questions of inheritance have been brought together in the second volume.
Moreover, headings which refer to typical issues governed by ius propriumwere
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11 For example in the very truncated version of Nicolas du Fief’s reports edited and published in Lille
in 1773. It was a system very popular in France among practitioners.
12 I have used the edition: Ioannes Wamesius, Responsorum sive consiliorum de iure pontificio
Tomus I[-II], Lovanii, typis Iacobi Zegers, 1643 (ed. pr. I: 1605; II: 1618, both ex officinaGerardiRivii).
13 I have used the edition: IoannesWamesius,Responsorum sive consiliorum ad ius, forumque civile
pertinentium, Centuria prima [-quinta], Antverpiae, Apud Henricum Aertssens, 1639 [II:
Antverpiae 1641; III: Lovanii, apud viduam Henrici Hastenii, 1631; IV: Lovanii 1632, V: Antverpiae
1641] (the ed. pr. for the first volume seems to be Louvain, Hastenius,1625).
sometimesmore difficult to bring under the order of the Digest or the Code, and
have therefore been gathered differently, such as a whole series of consilia on
various forms of repurchasing property (retractus), mostly governed by customs
and statutes, in the third centuria. As a result, it is possible for the reader to iden-
tify fairly easily consultations dealing (mainly or substantially) with a specific
topic, but only by looking up in each volume both the table of contents (which
lists the headings given to all the consultations) and the index materiarum.
A similar, but more effective system was applied for the six-volume collec-
tion of decisiones by Paul van Christynen (Christinaeus, 1541-1631), a lawyer
active in Mechlin and in various Brabant courts. His Decisiones were first pub-
lished during the second quarter of the seventeenth century, and there is evi-
dence that the author himself had a hand in the arrangement of the collection14.
The first volume starts off with a series of decisiones for which the headings indi-
cate that they discuss core issues with regard to supreme judicature and the
authority of supreme courts’ decisions15. This is followed by several decisiones
where the headline refers to issues of appellate jurisdiction and appeal and revi-
sion proceedings16. After that, the sequence of headings becomesmore arbitrary:
a more detailed analysis of those decisiones suggests that Christinaeus was at
that stage using former (unpublished) notes and compilations, some written by
earlier authors, some of his own17. From volume II onwards, the arrangement
(announced on the title-pages) follows strictly the order of the titles in the Code.
As any reader at the time would have been sufficiently acquainted with that
order, it greatly facilitates the use of the collection, although here, too, any
methodical research requires also looking up in each volume the table of con-
tents (giving the sequence of the headlines) and, in particular, the index of sub-
ject-matters. For a number of specialized topics, themedieval version of the code
has been supplemented (in the fifth volume)with the titles of theTres Libri, thus
completing the whole sequence of Justinian’s Code. Finally, the sixth volume is
entirely compiled with decisiones on feudal law.
Christinaeus’s collection of decisiones is therefore, except for the greatest
part of entries in the first volume, more systematic than Wamesius’s collection
of civil law consultations, but the difference is relative, as both a consultation and
a decisio may deal with a variety of issues. This is particularly true in
Christinaeus’s work whenever he actually reports on a specific (or several specific)
cases, but it should be remembered that for many rubrics of the code, what is
presented as a decisio in Christinaeus’s collection is in fact a more general short
doctrinal treatment of the subject, which then may or may not be illustrated or
corroborated with a passing reference to a case or even more generally the
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14 I have used the edition: Paulus Christinaeus, Practicarum quaestionum rerumque in supremis
Belgarum curiis actarum et observatarum Decisiones, in sex volumina distributae ..., 6 vols.,
Antverpiae, Verdussen, 1661 (ed. pr. Antverpiae, Verdussen, 1626-1632).
15 I. Decc. 1-12, e.g. Dec. I.1: «An sententiae vel decisiones supremi concilii, vel summorum tribunal-
ium, exemplum et praeiudicia statuant».
16 I. Decc. 13-45.
17 Wijffels, Legal records and reports cit., pp. 193-196.
practice of the courts18. Although neither the collection of Wamesius nor that of
Christinaeus follow the Institutes, the fact that both follow for the most part a
sequence inspired by the Code (and, inWamesius’s case, theDigest) underscores
the fact that Roman law is formally and substantially a major reference in both
authors’ arguments; at the same time, depending on the topics and issues in each
single entry, the argument may also include more or less extensively the appli-
cation of iura propria (customary or statutory law). The end result is, at a time
which was still a period of transition, a type of legal literature which combines
both characteristics ascribed to the early-modern legal methods.
Reflecting the advocates’ legal practice in the courts, the ius commune
authorities referred to inWamesius’s consilia (whichmust date for themost part
from the second half of the sixteenth century) and in Christinaeus’s decisiones
(which, but for a few borrowings from earlier collections, can mostly be dated
from approximately the last quarter of the sixteenth century and the first quar-
ter of the seventeenth century), still belong to a large extent to the late-medieval
and sixteenth-century literature of the “Italian” methods; in Christinaeus’s col-
lection, themore recent literature with a greater focus on (Belgian and foreign19)
iura propria or beginning to display more systematizing tendencies appears
already with a stronger emphasis. Themos italicus authorities gradually reced-
ed in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, without entirely
disappearing, but by the second half of the seventeenth century, iura propria
authorities andworks organised by subject-matter prevailed. Concomitantly, the
reasoning in practice-related literature became more strictly disciplined and
bound by rules directly related to the issues under discussion. By that time, the
paradigm of themos italicus had given way to that of the usus modernus 20.
4. The demise of themos italicus: political factors
That changing pattern of legal reasoning can be related to other, similar
changes in different areas of scholarship in early-modern times, breaking away
from medieval scholastic methods21. Apparently, the changes in legal scholarship
and its repercussions in legal practice reflected broader intellectual and cultural
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18 For examples, see A. Wijffels, Business Relations Between Merchants in Sixteenth-Century
Belgian Practice-Orientated Civil Law Literature, in From lex mercatoria to commercial law, edit-
ed by V. Piergiovanni, Berlin 2005, pp. 255-290, andmy articlementioned in the following footnote.
19 A. Wijffels, Orbis exiguus. Foreign authorities in Paulus Christinaeus’s Law Reports, in Ratio
decidendi. Guiding Principles of Judicial Decisions. Vol. 2, Foreign Law, edited by W.H. Bryson, S.
Dauchy, M. Mirow, Berlin 2010, pp. 37-62.
20 A. Wijffels, Van Paul van Christijnen (†1631) tot Jean-Alphonse de Coloma (†1739): rechters en
advocaten bij de Grote Raad van Mechelen tegen de achtergrond van de zeventiende-eeuwse
Europese rechtsontwikkeling, in «De zeventiende eeuw», 9 (1993), 1, pp. 3-14.
21 A major theme in H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution II. The Impact of the Protestant Refor-
mations on the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge Mass.-London 2003, esp. chapter 3; the pre-
vailing ius communemethods before the systematizing tendencies started have been accurately set
out byH. Coing,Europäisches Privatrecht,Bd. I,Älteres Gemeines Recht (1500 bis 1800), München
1985, pp. 15-24.
developments inWestern Europe. Other factors, however, may also have played a
part in the demise of themos italicus. One of these factors appears to be linked to
the obsolescence of the political context in which themos italicus had evolved and
thrived. In very general terms, the evidence is that in the course of the sixteenth
century, legal practice shows a growing tension between the qualifications
assumed or worked out bymedievalmos italicus learningwith respect to the exer-
cise of supreme political authority and the growing effectiveness of supreme polit-
ical power during the sixteenth century. Or, phrased differently (at the risk of over-
simplifying the issue), that the balance between the medieval legal concepts of
“absolute” supreme political power (also referred to as «potestas extraordinaria»)
and the “ordinary” exercise of supreme political power (referred to as «potestas
ordinaria») was tilted in favour of the former. Whereas in the political context of
the medieval Italian peninsula, the political weight of the city-states was such that
in legal theory, the supreme authority of the emperor (or even, in several
autonomous territories, of the pope) could be acknowledged in theory, without
fearing that it would affect the public governance of the city very much in day-to-
day practice, during the sixteenth century, the emerging political theory of sover-
eign power became in several polities, not least outside Italy, to somedegree a real-
ity. That was the well-known development of the early-modern concept of “abso-
lutist” sovereignty, which was not bound by any concurrent political authority
within the territory, nor by any political authority above the realm. In legal terms,
it meant that the sovereign ruler was now the only authority who would ultimate-
ly decide what the law was, and whether or not his actions would have to abide by
the law. Inmedieval (mos italicus) legal theory, the phrase potestas extraordinar-
iawas precisely what it said: a power which could be, but only would be, exercised
in extraordinary, exceptional circumstances; the ordinary, usual practice of public
governance was through the exercise of the potestas ordinaria. One of the defin-
ing distinctions between the two was that the latter was exercised according to the
rule of law,whereas the extraordinary exercise of power allowed the ruler to depart
from legal constraints22. Early-modern political theories emphasizing the
supremacy of the sovereign were paving the way towards absolutist rule because
they allowed more readily the exercise of the extraordinary power, which became
for some rulers all the more attractive since, within their polity, the balance of
power had shifted in such a way that they faced far less than in earlier times any
political counter-weight. During the sixteenth century, the theoretical supreme
political power of the laterMiddle Ages was becomingwithin particular polities an
effective political power. Late-medievalmos italicuswas steeped in a political envi-
ronment and culture which emphasized the rule of law. The emergence of early-
modern absolutist power was increasingly incompatible with that legal tradition23.
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22 K. Pennington, The Prince and the Law 1200-1600. Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal
Tradition, Berkeley-Los Angeles-Oxford 1993, pp. 54-77 and passim.
23 On the significance of (late-)medieval law for the concept of Rechtsstaatlichkeit (here for conven-
ience sake translated as rule of law): R.C. van Caenegem, The Modernity of Medieval Law, in
«TRG», 68 (2000), pp. 313-329.
Sixteenth-century legal practice at the “supreme court” of the Low Countries
(i.e. the Great Council of Mechlin) reflects the tensions between the old tradi-
tion24 and the new political tendencies. A few case-studies, which can here only
be discussed in succinct terms25, show that the use ofmos italicus references to
the requirements for exercising the potestas extraordinariawere coming under
the strain of a political situation where it became increasingly difficult to recon-
cile political expediency and due process of law. The exercise of supreme politi-
cal power had been buttressed by the reliance on the concept of utilitas publica,
a concept acknowledged in mos italicus doctrines, and legal practitioners had
actively adopted the concept whenever it was in their client’s interest to put for-
ward a statute, grant or decision of the prince in order to override the private or
particular interest of their opponent26.
A first example27 is offered by a case from the 1540s opposing the creditor of
a licensed loan-monger who had been convicted of counterfeiting coins and exe-
cuted, and the Proctor General, representing the Crown’s interests, after the
counterfeiter’s estate had been confiscated. At one stage of the litigation, the
creditor’s counsel was arguing in favour of the prince’s supreme power to legis-
late: with regard to the prohibition of usury, the advocate quoted Bartolus and
Innocentius for arguing that in order to secure public interest (utilitas publica),
the ruler could even restrict and change divine law28. This put the Proctor
General in the rather uncomfortable positionwhere he had to argue that on such
issues (the argument was extended by analogy to homicide and adultery), secu-
lar lawhad to defer to the lawof theChurch.However, in the same case, the cred-
itor’s counsel also had to argue (so that his client could benefit from the terms of
the license of a loan-house which the emperor had granted to the client’s debtor)
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24 Throughout the sixteenth century,mos italicus prevailed in the advocates’ practice at the Great
Council: A. Wijffels, Qui millies allegatur. Les allégations du droit savant dans les dossiers du
Grand Conseil de Malines (causes septentrionales, ca. 1460-1580), 2 vols., Amsterdam and
Leiden 1985.
25 For a more detailed analysis and further references to primary and secondary sources, see the
published case-studies mentioned for every example. Other examples could be drawn to the same
effect and in order to argue the same point for other jurisdictions, e.g. in the international contro-
versy between the GermanHanse and England in the 1550s (whenMudaeus and Leoninus acted as
consultants to the Hanse), see A. Wijffels, International Trade Disputes and ius commune: Legal
Arguments on the ‘Gdańsk Issue’ during the Hanseatic Embassy to London in 1553, inEine Grenze
in Bewegung: Öffentliche und private Justiz im Handels- und Seerecht. Une frontière mouvante:
Justice privée et justice publique en matières commerciales et maritimes, hrsg. von A. Cordes, S.
Dauchy,München 2013, pp. 65-89; and in J.Mearns,A consultation by Andrea Alciato on the laws
of war, in «TRG», 2013 (forthcoming), on litigation before the Reichskammergericht opposing
Henry II (the Younger), Duke of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, on the one hand, and the town of
Goslar, together with the leaders of the Schmalkaldic League, on the other.
26 That use of the concept of utilitas publica can be found in several other cases of litigation before
the Great Council during the late fifteenth century and during the sixteenth century, e.g. A. Wijffels,
Gelehrtes Recht und Wirtschaftsordnung: Niederländische ‘Bierkriege’ im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert,
in «Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte», 25 (2003), pp. 177-203.
27 For a full discussion, see A.Wijffels, Een prince ende heere van justitie.Un avis de G. Mudaeus sur
l’organisation d’une table de prêt, in «TRG», 64 (1996), pp. 113-139.
28 Transcripts of the full argument, including the allegationes iuris cit., pp. 122-123.
that a ruler, because he must be assumed to act as a «prince and lord of justice»
(in Dutch: «een prince ende heere van justitie», and because «in principe pre-
sumitur iustitia»), he was bound by his own («contractual») obligations. The
argument touched all the more upon a fundamental political issue, because it
referred to an important statute of the emperor from 1540which had authorized
interest-loans between merchants. The case shows that, the protests of the
Proctor General notwithstanding, the somewhat opportunistic argument of the
creditor’s counsel had a point, for the emperor’s recent legislative act on usury
had been justified by the general interest of the commonwealth.
A second example29 is that of a case (1548-1559) which involved major eco-
nomic and commercial interests linked to the Low Countries’ international mar-
itime trade. The Brabant city of Antwerp tried to counter the Zeeland city of
Middelburg’s attempts to acquire the position of a staple in the Scheldt estuary
by interpreting and applying extensively its right of gauge, which Middelburg
had obtained through a series of (quasi-statutory) privileges. After protracted
proceedings in first instance and revision before the Great Council, Antwerp,
having lost its case, started to lobby the Estates of Brabant so that the emperor’s
statute which allowed Middelburg’s control of maritime trade would be abol-
ished or at least restricted. Both during the proceedings and (in the case of
Antwerp) after the case had been finally decided, Louvain professors were
pressed into service and commissioned (by both sides) to write consilia.
Middelburg could rely on favourable statutory provisions (issued by the emper-
or in 1524 and 1546) on gauge-duty and staple-privilege. Those provisions were
expressions of the ruler’s economic policies, no doubt part of his legislative pre-
rogative when addressing the (economic) interests of his commonwealth. E. de
Leeuw (Leoninus, 1519-1598) advised in two consultations on behalf of
Middelburg that the statutes were consistent with the general interest and equi-
ty. His client could therefore rely on provisions which met the standards «utili-
tati reipublicae et Principi, et ad magis conservandam justitiam in commerci-
is»30. After losing the case in revision, Antwerp’s lobbying in Brussels relied part-
ly on an extensive legal consultation co-signed by de Leeuw’s colleagues in
Louvain G. van der Muyden, P. Peck and J. Wamèse. One of the difficulties the
three consultants for Antwerp faced was the dilemma in applying for a revoca-
tion or restriction of a statutory act of the supreme ruler, for they had to enlist
the support of the Estates of Brabant: they therefore had to argue that the ruler
did have the power to exercise his supreme power in order to abolish the statute
(even at the expense of Middelburg’s vested interests), but at the same time that
the ruler was bound by his constitutional obligations (laid down in a medieval
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29 A. Wijffels, Ius commune and international wine trade. A revision (Middelburg c. Antwerp,
1548-1559), in «TRG», 71 (2003), pp. 289-317; A. Wijffels, A consultancy on wine imports, in
«TRG», 73 (2005), pp. 321-355; A. Wijffels,Wamèse, la pratique du droit commercial dans l’œu-
vre d’un professeur louvaniste, in Liber Amicorum Guy Horsmans, Bruxelles 2004, pp. 1151-1175,
at pp. 1167-1174.
30 Wijffels, Ius commune and international wine trade cit., pp. 305 and 308.
covenant31) towards his Brabant subjects. The consultants thus also relied on the
utilitas publica, claiming that the statute’s extensive implementation by
Middelburg caused a «Belgicae gravissimum praeiudicium». At the same time,
they also tried to argue that the ruler was bound by the covenant that legitimized
his authority over the Brabant subjects:
For such laws have the authority and scope of conventions or contracts.When they acquire
a conventional character, constitutions, ordinances, privileges and statutes become irrev-
ocable, and have therefore the same obligatory force for the prince as for any other person.
They cannot be repealed, not even by the pope or the emperor, not even by virtue of the
plenitudo potestatis, as somewould have it. By his oath and themutual solemn promise of
fidelity, the prince is deemed to have waived any possibility to depart from his obligations.
The powers of the prince are indeed conferred to him in order to be exercised according to
true equity, and not on behalf of particular favours, as it has been observed [by Nicolaus
de Tudeschis, following Saint Thomas]. Therefore, because the emperor Charles could not
have issued such a statute or granted such a privilege at the expense of the Brabant people,
without having given them an opportunity to submit their arguments, and because it can-
not be assumed that he would have had any such intention by expressing himself in such
broad terms, without specifying their object, and considering that the terms of the statute
can be construed differently, so as to avoid any breach of the fundamental privilege and
rights of the Brabant people, the rule “potius valeat quam pereat” should apply, and the
author of the statute is deemed to have acted in conformity with, rather than in violation
of, the laws, ordinances and statutes.
Once more, one may be tempted to recognize in the consultants’ balancing
act a degree of opportunistic advocacy. What the ambivalence illustrates, how-
ever, is how traditional legal authorities were adduced (in this example, once
again by the same litigant) both in order to prop up the exercise of “absolute”
power by the ruler (in order to set aside a statute) and in order to uphold the
ruler’s submission to a political covenant. The apparent contradiction is some-
what attenuated by the reference to the concept of utilitas publica, which allows
to support the client’s claim by introducing policy considerations aiming at
establishing that the client’s interest is more compatible with the general welfare
than the opponent’s interests at stake.
A third example (in which litigation covered the period 1559-1574)32 was a
case of compensation and liability for the loss of a cargo following an accident in
the course of transport by river. In this case, also, the alleged corporate liability
of the Ghent free shippers raised the issue of interpreting an ordinance of
Charles V. The ordinance of 14 February 1541 on the carriage of goods on the
rivers Scheldt and Leie was, again, a statute which expressed the ruler’s eco-
nomic and commercial policies. At the same time, it had an unmistakable polit-
ical resonance, for it had been issued in the almost immediate aftermath of the
Ghent rebellion of 1537-1540, one of the last – and doomed – attempts of a once
137
Early-Modern consilia and decisiones in the Low Countries
31 A reference to the Brabant Joyeuse Entrée (Blijde Inkomst) of 1356, to which each new duke of
Brabant plegded his oath at his accession until the end of the Ancien Régime.
32 A. Wijffels, Vicarious liability for the carrier by river?, in «TRG», 75 (2007), pp. 333-353, based
on original unpublished records and on consilia by Leoninus and Wamesius; the case is also twice
referred to in Christinaeus’s Decisiones.
powerful city to assert the legal and political autonomy it had acquired in
medieval times against an early-modern sovereign. The pre-enactment stages of
the statute show that the emperor had taken advantage of a collective action by
several cities from the Belgian provinces against Ghent in the wake of the latter’s
political and judicial punishment in order to intervene in the regulation of inter-
regional river transport in Flanders. The corporation’s legal advisers had the task
of arguing that, the broad terms of the ordinance of 1541 notwithstanding33, the
ordinance had to be construed narrowly, so as to exclude the corporation’s
prima facie liability. That was of course a highly conventional interpretatory
technique of ius commune, consisting in imposing a strict interpretation to ius
proprium (at least, when it departed from ius commune rules). In this case, how-
ever, it is clear that the legal consultants would not hedge all their bets by mere-
ly referring to ius commune rules of construction aiming at restricting a statute’s
scope, but theywent out of their way to establish that the political considerations
behind the ordinance were consistent with the defense of their clients. In other
words, the ability to restrict an enactment of the sovereign could no longer rely
exclusively on ius commune authorities, but had to be underpinned by an argu-
mentation which looked at the sovereign’s statute in its own right.
Finally, as a last example from the same period, in a case dealt with quasi-
judicially by thePrivyCouncil during the years 1562-156434, the issuewaswhether
the ruler could forbid the implementation of an exemption of taxes granted by
way of “contractual privilege” by the city of Bruges to the merchants of the
Spanish nation in that city. Wamesius wrote a consultation on behalf of the
Spanishmerchants,who insisted on their exemption, or onbeing compensatedby
Bruges for any taxes theywere forced to pay. The division of the arguments in this
case seems to have opposed the Proctor General, who followed a public-law rea-
soning, and the Spanish Nation, whose arguments were mainly drawn from pri-
vate-law principles. The Proctor General relied on the administrative subordina-
tion of the city to the sovereign, and argued that the taxes had been levied in order
to meet a state of necessity (viz. the costs of war) and were therefore justified by
the utilitas publica, which allowed to cancel all private privileges. Counsel for the
Spanishmerchants had to counter those claims by asserting that any prohibitions
formulated by the prince against exemption privileges did not affect vested con-
tractual rights, and that in any case, such rights could not be set asidewithout due
process of law. The case ended with a decision of the Privy Council which may
have reflected a political compromise, but again, the discussion during the pro-
ceedings highlights the fact that the legal arguments for or against the ruler’s pre-
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33 For the background and pre-enactment proceedings of the ordinance, Wijffels, Vicarious liability
cit., pp. 336-338; for an English translation of the relevant section of the ordinance, ibidem, p. 343.
34 A. Wijffels, Une consultation de Wamèse sur une question de droit fiscal, in Liber amicorum
Jacques Malherbe, Bruxelles 2006, pp. 1169-1193 (including a French translation of Wamesius’s
consilium). The case inwhichWamesius intervened as a consultant had been triggered by an exemp-
tion of beer excises; a few years earlier, a similar case between the same parties with regard to an
exemption of wine excises had been decided by the Great Council of Mechlin.
rogative to frustrate the exercise of existing legal rights were being increasingly
overshadowed by the ruler’s growing ability to avail himself of his political pre-
ponderance – the utilitas publica argument could henceforth be called upon in
circumstances which were hardly exceptional any more in early-modern public
governance.
5. A provisional conclusion
Sixteenth-century legal practice in the supreme courts of the Low Countries
reflects the growing strain on the medieval concept of extraordinary or absolute
power. In the political context of the Italian city-states where the mos italicus
had been developed in the law faculties and in the courts, potestas extraordi-
nariawas essentially a security valve of public governance, aimed at securing (in
exceptional circumstances) the city’s paramount interests. In the normal course
of political life, the exercise of the potestas ordinaria ensured that the rule of law
and due process of law prevailed. The emergence of the early-modern concept of
sovereignty was not merely a political theory, in many polities it also reflected a
new political reality, a new balance of power in favour of the new-style sovereign.
In that new political context, the old medieval theory of potestas underwent a
transformation. What had been a potestas extraordinaria could easily become
the ordinary way of conducting political affairs by an absolute ruler, especially if
he could legitimize his action and policies by invoking the utilitas publica, of
which he was now the sole representative. Of course, such a radical course was
not achieved in all the European polities, but it was at least a general tendency.
In this paper, it has been argued that those political developments, the impact of
which can be followed in contemporary legal practice of the higher courts, con-
tributed to undermine, and eventually to discard, direct reliance on themos itali-
cus learning. Other factors, such as the early-modern intellectual propensity to
seek other forms of systematization, also played a role. However, the legacy of
the mos italicus was not entirely lost. Just as many legal doctrines on specific
topics were saved through a translatio studiorum and incorporated by the usus
modernus, a certain tradition of due process of lawwas upheld, not least through
the practice of the superior courts, even in those jurisdictions where political
absolutismmade themost progress. That contribution to the rule of law –which
for the sake of simplicity can here be assimilated with the notions of état de droit
or Rechtsstaatlichkeit in a broad sense – was one of the most fundamental and
long-term achievements of the early-modern higher courts – Mario Ascheri’s
beloved grandi tribunali –, not only in Italy, but throughout Europe.
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